UN MODELO DE GASTO PÚBLICO LOCAL: RECONSIDERANDO EL MODELO DE TIEBOUT
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Local Public Expenditure, Tiebout Hypothesis, Fiscal Decentralization, Efficiency, DistributionResumo
La teoría del gasto público local se concibe formalmente desde la hipótesis de Tiebout en 1956. La consideración de un mecanismo para la revelación de las preferencias por bienes públicos introdujo un argumento estrictamente teórico a favor de la descentralización fiscal. Este trabajo parte de la hipótesis de Tiebout para examinar las condiciones bajo las cuales sigue siendo válida analíticamente. A partir de la formalización matemática, se propone un modelo teórico de gasto público local, que analiza íntegramente, los condicionantes de un gobierno descentralizado en términos de sus funciones de asignación y distribución.Downloads
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